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Abstract
We study a general scenario where confidential information is dis-
tributed among a group of agents who wish to share it in such a way that
the data becomes common knowledge among them but an eavesdropper
intercepting their communications would be unable to obtain any of said
data. The information is modelled as a deck of cards dealt among the
agents, so that after the information is exchanged, all of the communicat-
ing agents must know the entire deal, but the eavesdropper must remain
ignorant about who holds each card.
Valentin Goranko and the author previously set up this scenario as
the secure aggregation of distributed information problem and constructed
weakly safe protocols, where given any card c, the eavesdropper does not
know with certainty which agent holds c. Here we present a perfectly safe
protocol, which does not alter the eavesdropper’s perceived probability
that any given agent holds c. In our protocol, one of the communicating
agents holds a larger portion of the cards than the rest, but we show how
for infinitely many values of a, the number of cards may be chosen so that
each of the m agents holds more than a cards and less than 2m2a.
1 Introduction
Consider a multi-agent network, where each individual holds private informa-
tion which must be shared among the group, perhaps to reach a consensus or
to share a secret. Communication among the agents may be intercepted, lead-
ing to the risk of an eavesdropper obtaining confidential data. If encryption
is either impossible or undesirable, the agents may use an unconditionally se-
cure protocol, where the exchange would not contain enough information for
an eavesdropper to learn a secret [10]. This scenario may crop up in many
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applications, for example when fusing sensorial information or data from com-
putations performed by the individual agents. Alternately, it may have been
distributed among the agents in such a way that only by pooling together their
knowledge will they have access to sensitive information, as may be the case in
secret-sharing protocols [2, 11].
We will model a situation of this form, where the information is represented
by a deck of cards Ω dealt among m agents. The dealing phase is treated as a
black box and assumed to be secure. Each of the agents may see her hand, but
not the others’. They then want to inform each other of which cards they hold.
Meanwhile, the eavesdropper, Eve, may intercept all communications, and the
agents do not want her to obtain information about who holds any card. In this
setting, we will show that for many possible distributions of cards among the
agents, it is indeed possible for them to share the data securely.
1.1 Comparison to known results
The model we consider is a multi-agent variation of the well-known Russian
cards problem. The latter may be traced back to [7] but has recently received
renewed attention [14], leading to many new solutions (e.g. [1, 3, 13]). In the
original Russian cards problem, there are only two communicating agents. In
[6], this was generalized by allowing an arbitrary number of agents, but also
simplified by assuming that the eavesdropper has no cards in her hand. A key
difference between the two-agent and multi-agent setting is that with only two
agents, two announcements are usually sufficient for the information exchange,
whereas in our setting one might expect to have at least one announcement per
agent. However, we remark that longer protocols are already needed to solve
some instances with two agents [4, 15].
There is more than one way to model the safety constraint. For any card
c not held by Eve, she should not know with certainty which agent holds c;
this is known as weak safety. But it may be the case that Eve has a very high
probability of guessing correctly who holds c. To this end, [13] introduced the
stronger notion of perfect safety, where Eve’s perceived probability that an agent
holds c does not change after executing the protocol. Perfectly safe solutions
for a wider number of cases were later reported in [12], and [8] proposed an
approximate notion which led to ‘almost-perfectly’ safe solutions.
In [6] we formalized the secure aggregation of distributed information prob-
lem and constructed weakly safe solutions for any number of agents. Our goal
now is to construct, instead, perfectly safe solutions. These are based on finite
linear algebra, and typically one agent holds a large portion of the cards. How-
ever, for infinitely many values of a, the size of the deck may be chosen so that
each of the m agents holds more than a and less than 4m2a of the cards.
1.2 Layout of the article
In Section 2 we present a motivating example illustrating our protocol in an
informal setting. Section 3 then formalizes the secure aggregation of distributed
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information problem and Section 4 introduces the notion of perfect safety. Our
protocol is based on finite linear algebra, which we review in Section 5 along
with some general lemmas we need. In Section 6 we define the protocol and
show that it is informative, while in Section 7 we prove that it is perfectly
safe. Finally, in Section 8 we show how one can find relatively balanced card
distributions to which the protocol may be applied.
2 A motivating example
Let us begin by presenting a solution for a distribution of type (12, 2, 2). This
means that Alice draws twelve cards from a deck of sixteen, while Bob and Cath
each draw two cards. Let us use HA, HB and HC to denote the set of hands
held by Alice, Bob and Cath, respectively. Then, for any card c, the probability
that a given agent holds c is proportional to the number of cards in their hand;
thus, P(c ∈ HA) = 12/16 and P(c ∈ HB) = P(c ∈ HC) = 2/16.
Now, let us show how Alice, Bob and Cath can communicate their cards to
each other by way of public broadcasts, in such a way that, after the exchange,
each of Alice, Bob and Cath knows the entire deal, without changing Eve’s
perceived probabilities that a given agent holds a given card. Alice will make
the first announcement, followed by Bob; it is not necessary for Cath to make
an announcement in this setting since she merely holds the complement of Alice
and Bob’s hands.
2.1 Alice’s announcement
Here we use the fact that there is a field F4, whose elements are {0, 1, ϕ, ϕ
2}
satisfying 1 + 1 = 0 and ϕ2 = ϕ + 1. With this we construct a 16-point plane,
F
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4. Alice makes her announcement as follows. First, she randomly assigns each
card in the deck to a point on the plane, with the only condition that the cards
she does not1 hold form a line ℓ. In the figure, Bob holds spades, Cath holds
clubs and Alice holds diamonds, so that ℓ is the diagonal y = x.
Alice then announces,
The complement of my hand forms a line of the form y = ax+ b on
the plane F24.
Observe that, since there are four choices for each of a and b, there are a total
of 16 possible deals according to Alice’s announcement.
Because Bob holds two cards, and two points define a line, Bob knows exactly
which line his and Cath’s cards lie on and thus he knows Alice’s hand. Similarly,
Cath knows Alice’s hand, and in this example in fact Bob and Cath know the
entire deal. However, they must inform Alice of their hand. For this, Bob must
make an additional announcement.
1Compare this to the protocol presented in [3], where it is Alice’s hand that would form a
line rather than its complement.
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Figure 1: Alice holds the complement of the line y = x in the 16-point plane.
2.2 A weakly card-safe announcement for Bob
So it remains for Bob and Cath to inform Alice of their hands. A simple idea
that they could use is simply to announce the first coordinates of the points on
their hand. In the figure, Bob would say “The first coordinates of my hand are
{1, ϕ2}”, while Cath would say “The first coordinates of my hand are {0, ϕ}.”
In fact, Cath’s announcement follows from Bob’s, so she may actually omit it.
As mentioned, Bob and Cath already knew the entire deal, but now Alice can
use the fact that each point of ℓ is uniquely determined by its first coordinate to
infer Bob’s and Cath’s actual hand. Meanwhile, given any card c, Eve cannot
tell whether or not Alice holds c. Consider, for example, the card (0, 0). In
the actual deal, Alice does not hold this card, but the only information that
Eve has is that Alice holds the complement of a line of the form y = ax + b.
Thus if b 6= 0, Alice would in fact hold (0, 0). This means that there are three
possible values for b which would let Alice hold the origin, and for each choice
there are four possible values of a, giving us a total of 12 possible deals (from
Eve’s perspective) under which Alice holds (0, 0).
However, this exchange is not perfectly safe. For indeed, since she knows
that Bob’s hand projects onto {1, ϕ2}, Eve can infer that Bob does not hold
the card (0, 0). Thus this protocol is only weakly safe. But there is a variation
which does yield perfect safety.
2.3 A perfectly card-safe announcement for Bob
The only thing that Eve knows about ℓ is that it is of the form y = ax+ b. This
a will be used to shift the elements of F4 around and add more uncertainty to
Bob’s announcement. To be precise, if ℓ has slope a, Bob will now announce,
instead of the first coordinates of his hand, these coordinates plus a. Let σ(ℓ)
denote the slope of ℓ. In this example, since Bob’s hands project onto {1, ϕ2}
and ℓ has slope 1, Bob will instead announce the value of
{1, ϕ2}+ σ(ℓ) = {1, ϕ2}+ 1 = {0, ϕ};
note that we are using the convention that X + y = {x + y : x ∈ X}. His
announcement will then take the form
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“If my hand, HB, lies on a line ℓ, then
HB + σ(ℓ) = {0, ϕ}.”
This new protocol is actually perfectly safe. To see this, first note as before
that Alice can hold any card (just replace ℓ by a parallel line as needed). But
any card may also be held by Bob or by Cath. Let us show this with the card
(0, 0), held by Cath. Because in the actual deal Cath holds (0, 0), Eve evidently
finds is possible that Cath holds it.
However, Eve also considers it possible that Bob holds it instead. There are
four lines ℓ′ passing through (0, 0) of the form y = ax+ b, and Eve considers all
of these as the possible set of cards that Bob and Cath hold. If ℓ′ has slope 1,
as is actually the case, then Cath would hold (0, 0). But suppose instead that
ℓ′ is the line given by y = ϕx, so that
ℓ′ = {(0, 0), (1, ϕ), (ϕ, ϕ2), (ϕ2, 1)}.
Then, ℓ′ has slope ϕ, and σ(ℓ′) = ϕ. If indeed Bob and Cath’s hands lied on
ℓ′, according to Bob’s announcement, the first coordinates of his hand would be
0− σ(ℓ′) = ϕ and ϕ− σ(ℓ′) = 0, so that in this case Bob would hold (0, 0).
0
1
ϕ
ϕ2
0 1 ϕ ϕ2
♠
♦
♦
♦
♦
♦
♣
♦
♦
♦
♦
♠
♦
♣
♦
♦
Figure 2: According to Bob’s announcement, if Bob and Cath held the line
y = ϕx, this is how the cards would be dealt.
More generally, if ℓ′ is given by y = ax, then Bob would hold (0, 0) if
a ∈ {0, ϕ}, while Cath would hold it if a ∈ {1, ϕ2}. This means that, from
Eve’s perspective, there are two possible deals where Bob holds (0, 0) and two
possible deals where Cath holds it. But as we saw above, there are 12 possible
deals where Alice holds (0, 0); we also saw that there are a total of 16 possible
deals, so Cath’s perceived probability that Alice, Bob or Cath holds (0, 0) are
12/16, 2/16 and 2/16, respectively; the same as before the protocol began!
A similar exercise may be applied to any point (x, y) on the plane to verify
that this occurs for any card and thus the protocol is indeed perfectly safe.
2.4 Generalizing to more agents
In a more general setting, there may be m+ 1 communicating agents
{A,B1, . . . ,Bm}.
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We will work in Fd+1q , where q > m is a prime power and d > 0. Alice will hold
all cards except for those that would make up a hyperplane; that is, she would
hold qd+1−qd cards, which is more than any other agent. The rest of the agents
share the remaining qd cards, with the only restriction that each of them holds
more than qd−1 of them. Then, Alice will assign a point on Fd+1q to each card
in such a way complement of her cards form a hyperplane V of the form
xd+1 = a1x1 + . . .+ adxd + b
and announce her chosen assignment. Each other agent Bk holds enough cards
to be able to identify V , hence Alice’s hand. Then, we define
σ(V ) = (a1, . . . , ad) ∈ F
d
q
(the ‘slope’ of V , similar to a gradient). In our example, the line ℓ plays the
role of the hyperplane V (since a line on the plane is a hyperplane).
If we denote by π : Fd+1q → F
d
q the projection onto the first d components,
each agent Bk will announce
2 π[Yi] + σ(V ), where Yi is the set of points Bk
holds (technically, the image of Bk’s hand under Alice’s chosen assignment).
As we shall see, even in this more general setting, this protocol will always be
informative and perfectly safe. In the remainder of this paper, we will make
this precise.
3 Formalizing the problem
Here we will give the basic definitions needed to set up the secure aggregation
of distributed information problem, including the notions of informativity and
safety that concern us. This section is essentially a review of notions from [6],
although we remark that some of the terminology has changed.
3.1 Basic terminology and notation
Definition 3.1. Let I be a finite set representing a group of agents. By a
distribution type we mean a vector τ = (τX )X∈I of positive integers. We write
|τ | for
∑
X∈I τX .
The deck, Ω, is a finite set of cards with cardinality |τ |. A deal of type τ
over Ω is a partition H = (HX )X∈I of Ω such that |HX | = τX for each agent
X . We say HX is the hand of X . We denote the set of all deals of type τ over
Ω by
(
Ω
τ
)
.
We assume an initial secure dealing phase in which a card deal is selected
randomly. Afterwards, the agents have knowledge of their own hand and of the
distribution type τ of the deal, but know nothing more about others’ cards.
Thus, they are not able to distinguish between different deals where they hold
2In general, if f is a function we use f(x) to denote the value of f at a point and f [X] to
denote the image of a set X under f .
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the same hand. We model this by equivalence relations between deals; since
from the perspective of agent X , a deal H is indistinguishable from deal H ′
whenever HX = H
′
X , we define H ∼X H
′ if and only if HX = H
′
X . If the agents
are numbered X0, . . . ,Xm, we may write ∼k instead of ∼Xk .
We will fix a set Λ representing a language which the agents use to encode
information. In a practical setting, elements of Λ would be strings of symbols,
but could also be modelled as natural numbers; we will refer to them simply as
tokens. For simplicity we will assume that agents take turns, so that if they are
listed by X0, . . . ,Xm, then X0 places a token first, followed by X2, etc.
Definition 3.2 (Run). Let Λ be a set whose elements will be called tokens. A
(finite) run is a (possibly empty) sequence ρ = α0, . . . , αn of tokens from Λ. The
empty run is denoted by (). If ρ = α0, . . . , αn and α is a token we write ρ∗α for
α0, . . . , αn, α. An infinite run is an infinite sequence α0, α1, α2, . . . of tokens.
Runs will be assumed finite unless it is explicitly stated otherwise. We denote
the length of a run ρ by |ρ|. We denote the set of finite runs by Run.
We now define the notion of protocol we will use. Below we use (x)d to mean
the remainder of x modulo d.
Definition 3.3 (protocol). Let τ be a distribution type over I = (X0, . . . ,Xm).
A protocol (for τ) is a function Π assigning to every deal H ∈
(
Ω
τ
)
and every
run ρ ∈ Run a set of tokens Π(H, ρ) ⊂ Λ such that if k = (|ρ|)m+1 (so that it is
the turn of the agent Xk) and H ∼k H
′, then Π(H, ρ) = Π(H ′, ρ).
Thus, a protocol is a tree-like set of runs representing a non-deterministic
protocol for the communicating agents. Once a deal has been fixed, a protocol
assigns to each run a set of tokens out of which the agent whose turn it is
must choose one at random. These tokens are determined exclusively by the
information the agent has access to, which is assumed to be only: (i) her hand,
(ii) the distribution type τ and the deck Ω, (iii) the announcements that have
been made previously and (iv) the protocol being executed.
Note that protocols are generally non-deterministic and hence may have
many executions:
Definition 3.4. An execution of a protocol Π is a pair (H, ρ) consisting of a
deal H ∈
(
Ω
τ
)
and a run ρ = α0, . . . , αn, such that αk ∈ Π(H, ρ<k) for every
k ≤ n, where ρ<k = α0, . . . , αk−1 (ρ<0 is empty). We say that ρ is a run of Π
if there exists a deal H such that (H, ρ) is an execution of Π.
An execution of a protocol (H, ρ) is terminal if Π(H, ρ) = ∅. A protocol is
terminating if it has no infinite executions.
3.2 Informative and weakly safe protocols
Now we will define some desirable properties that protocols may have. The first
property is informativity: that agents in the team learn the entire deal at the
end of its execution:
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Definition 3.5 (Informativity). An execution (H, ρ) of a protocol Π is infor-
mative for an agent X if there is no execution (H ′, ρ) of Π with H ′ 6= H but
HX = H
′
X (i.e., at the end of the run the agent knows the precise card distribu-
tion.)
A terminating protocol Π is informative if every terminating execution of Π
is informative for every agent in I.
In [6] we considered a weak notion of safety and showed that informative
and weakly safe protocols exist for a large class of distribution types.
Definition 3.6 (Weak safety of protocols). An execution (H, ρ) of a protocol
Π is weakly safe for the card c if there are agents X 6= Y and a deal H ′ ∈
(
Ω
τ
)
such that (H ′, ρ) is also an execution of Π but c ∈ HX and c ∈ H
′
Y .
A protocol Π is weakly safe if every execution of Π is weakly safe for every
card.
However, a weakly safe protocol may give Eve a large amount of probabilistic
information. To this effect, in the next section we will turn to formalizing a
stronger notion of safety.
4 Perfect safety
A weakly safe protocol does not allow Eve to know with certainty who holds
a given card c, but she may gain other information about it; for example, she
may learn that a certain agent X does not hold c, or perhaps that an agent Y
is very likely to hold c. Thus it will be desirable to control the probabilistic
information that Eve obtains.
In order to do so, we will make two assumptions:
1. The dealer chooses uniformly from the set of all deals.
2. In any protocol Π, each agent always chooses uniformly from Π(H, ρ),
provided it is non-empty.
To compute the relevant probabilities, it will be useful to introduce the notation(
Ω
τ : C1, . . . , Cn
)
to denote the set of deals satisfying the constraints C1, . . . , Cn.
Definition 4.1. Fix a deck Ω, a distribution type τ and a protocol Π. Then
define:
• For a run ρ,
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
to be the set of all H ∈
(
Ω
τ
)
such that (H, ρ) is an
execution of Π. Elements of
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
are possible deals (according to Eve).
• For a card c and an agent X ,
(
Ω
τ : c
X
)
to be the set of deals H such that
c ∈ HX .
• For a run ρ, a card c and an agent X ,(
Ω
τ : ρ, c
X
)
=
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
∩
(
Ω
τ : c
X
)
,
the set of possible deals where X holds c.
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With this we can define the following generalization of a notion introduced
in [13].
Definition 4.2 (Equitative protocol). A protocol Π is equitative if for every
run ρ of Π there is a constant k = k(ρ) such that for every deal H ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
we
have that |Π(H, ρ)| = k.
In other words, |Π(H, ρ)| depends on ρ but not on H . Equitative protocols
will allow us to simplify many computations. Throughout the text, we use P to
denote probability.
Lemma 4.1. Let Π be an equitative protocol some distribution type τ and ρ be
a run of Π. Then, there is a constant γ = γ(ρ) ∈ (0, 1] so that, for any deal H,
P (ρ | H) =
{
γ if H ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
0 otherwise.
Proof. It is obvious that P (ρ | H) = 0 if H 6∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
. Otherwise, we proceed
by induction of the length of ρ.
For the base case, ρ = () and P (ρ | H) = 1 (since every execution begins
with the empty run). Otherwise, we consider a run of the form ρ ∗ α. Let
k = k(ρ) be such that |Π(H, ρ)| = k for any deal H ∈ Π(H, ρ). By induction
hypothesis, P (ρ | H) = γ′ = γ′(ρ) for any H ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
. Then, for any deal
H ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
,
P (ρ ∗ α | H) = P (α | ρ,H) P (ρ | H) = (1/k)γ′
and we can set γ(ρ ∗ α) = γ
′
/k.
Proposition 4.1. Let Π be an equitative protocol over some distribution type
τ . Then, for any run of the protocol ρ, c ∈ Ω and any X ∈ I,
P (c ∈ HX | ρ) =
∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
X
)∣∣
|(Ωτ : ρ)|
.
Proof. By Bayes’ law,
P (c ∈ HX | ρ) =
P (c ∈ HX , ρ)
P(ρ)
=
∑
H∈(Ωτ :c
X )
P (ρ | H)P(H)
∑
H∈(Ωτ)
P (ρ | H)P(H)
. (1)
But by Lemma 4.1, P (ρ | H) is some constant γ = γ(ρ) if H ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
and zero
otherwise. Moreover, since deals are also chosen uniformly, P(H) = δ for some
constant δ.
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Thus, (1) becomes∑
H∈(Ωτ :ρ,c
X )
P (ρ | H)P(H)
∑
H∈(Ωτ :ρ)
P (ρ | H)P(H)
=
∑
H∈(Ωτ :ρ,c
X )
γδ
∑
H∈(Ωτ :ρ)
γδ
=
∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
X
)∣∣
| (Ωτ : ρ) |
,
as claimed.
5 Geometric preliminaries
Our perfectly safe solution is based on finite linear algebra. We assume some
basic familiarity with finite fields and finite geometry; these are covered in texts
such as [9] and [5], respectively.
Throughout the paper, q will denote a prime or a power of a prime, and Fq
the field with q elements. If d is any natural number, Fdq denotes the vector
space of dimension d over Fq. Given U ⊂ F
d
q and v ∈ F
d
q , we write U + v for
the set {u + v : u ∈ U}. A hyperspace is a subspace of dimension d − 1, and
by a hyperplane we mean any set of the form V + x, where V is a hyperspace.
Two hyperplanes X,Y are parallel if X 6= Y but there is a vector x such that
X = Y + x.
Recall that |Fdq | = q
d, where in general |X | denotes the cardinality of X .
Moreover, if U 6= V are hyperplanes, then U has exactly qd−1 elements, while
|U ∩ V | ≤ qd−2 and equality holds unless U, V are parallel, in which case their
intersection is empty.
In our example in Section 2, it was important that the line ℓ have an equation
of the form y = ax+b. This readily generalizes to the higher-dimensional setting,
as defined below.
Definition 5.1. Given a prime power q and d > 0, we say that V ⊂ Fd+1q is a
transversal hyperplane if there are a1, . . . , ad ∈ Fq such that V is the graph of
xd+1 = a1x1 + . . .+ adxd + b.
If b = 0 then we say V is a transversal hyperspace.
We denote the set of transversal hyperplanes in Fd+1q by TH
d+1
q . Given
x ∈ Fd+1q , we denote by TH
d+1
q [x] the set of transversal hyperplanes in F
d+1
q
touching x.
It will be useful (and straightforward) to count the number of transversal
hyperplanes in Fd+1q .
Lemma 5.1. Fix a prime power q and a natural number d. Then,
1.
∣∣∣THd+1q ∣∣∣ = qd+1;
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2. for any x ∈ Fd+1q ,
∣∣∣THd+1q [x]∣∣∣ = qd.
Proof. For the first claim note that a transversal hyperplane is determined by
an equation
xd+1 = a1x1 . . . adxd + b
and there are q choices for each ak as well as for b, giving a total of q
d+1 options.
For the second, we may assume that x = ~0 without loss of generality. This
forces us to set b = 0. Then we must merely choose each ak, and since there are
d of them we have qd options.
Next, we define the ‘slope’ of a transversal hyperplane, which is itself a
vector.
Definition 5.2. Given a prime power q and a positive integer d, we define
σ : THd+1q → F
d
q given by σ(V ) = (a1, . . . , ad) whenever a1, . . . , ad ∈ Fq are such
that V is the graph of
xd+1 = a1x1 + . . .+ adxd + b.
The following is then immediate:
Lemma 5.2. Given a prime power q, d > 0 and x ∈ Fd+1q , the restriction
σ : THd+1q [x]→ F
d
q is a bijection.
It will also be useful to project the points on a transversal hyperplane V
onto their first d coordinates. In particular, the projection of one such point
will be sufficient to determine its missing component, provided we know what
V is.
Definition 5.3. Fix a prime power q and d > 0. We define π : Fd+1q → F
d
q by
π(x1, . . . , xd+1) = (x1, . . . , xd).
Lemma 5.3. Given a prime power q, d > 0 and V ∈ THd+1q , π : V → F
d
q is a
bijection. We denote its inverse by ιV .
Proof. If V is given by the equation
xd+1 = a1x1 + . . .+ adxd + b,
then it is easy to see that π : V → Fdq has an inverse given by
ιV (x1, . . . , xd) = (x1, . . . , xd, a1x1 + . . .+ adxd + b).
In Section 2, we saw that Bob constructed his announcement by projecting
and shifting. We also saw that Alice could reconstruct Bob’s hand from this
announcement. Let us now present these operations in more generality.
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Definition 5.4. Let V be a transversal hyperplane of Fd+1q . We define π
σ
V : V →
F
d
q by
πσV (w) = π(w) + σ(V )
and ισV : F
d
q → V by
ισV (y) = ιV
(
y − σ(V )
)
.
Lemma 5.4. If q is a prime power, d > 1 and V ∈ THd+1q , then π
σ
V ◦ ι
σ
V is the
identity on Fdq and ι
σ
V ◦ π
σ
V is the identity on V .
Proof. Using Lemma 5.3, we see that, for x ∈ Fdq ,
πσV ◦ ι
σ
V (x) = π
σ
V (ιV (x− σ(V ))) = π(ιV (x− σ(V ))) + σ(V )
= x− σ(V ) + σ(V ) = x.
That ισV ◦ π
σ
V is the identity on V is proven similarly.
6 The shifted projection protocol
With these ingredients we are ready to define our protocol. It depends on several
parameters which must be ‘suitably’ chosen, in the following sense.
Definition 6.1 (suitable parameters). We say (m, q, d, τ) are suitable param-
eters if m > 1, q > m is a prime power, d > 0, and τ is a distribution type
over I = {A,B1, . . . ,Bm} such that |τ | = q
d+1, τA = q
d+1 − qd and, for each
k ∈ [1,m], τBk > p
d−1.
Once we have selected suitable parameters, our protocol may be fully de-
termined by describing its maximal executions, since all other executions will
merely be initial segments of these. We will use this idea in order to simplify
the following definition.
Definition 6.2 (shifted projection protocol). Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable param-
eters and Ω be any set with qd elements. Then, given a deal H ∈
(
Ω
τ
)
, the
maximal executions of the shifted projection protocol are of the form
(H, f,X1, . . . , Xm),
where
• f : Ω→ Fdq is such that V = F
d+1
q \ f [HA] is a transversal hyperplane and
• for each k ∈ [1,m], Xk = π
σ
V [f [HBk ]].
The shifted projection protocol will be denoted SP.
Our goal is to prove the following:
Theorem 6.1. The shifted projection protocol is informative and perfectly safe
for any choice of suitable parameters.
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Before proceeding, we must check that we have actually given a protocol
according to our definitions.
Lemma 6.1. Given any choice of suitable parameters, the shifted projection
protocol is an equitative protocol.
Proof. We begin by checking that our protocol satisfies Definition 3.3. Suppose
that (m, q, d, τ) are suitable parameters. Let (H, ρ) be an execution of the
shifted projection protocol and α ∈ SP(H, ρ). Let X be the last agent to make
an announcement and H ′ be a deal such that HX = H
′
X and (H, ρ) is an
execution of our protocol. We must check that α ∈ SP(H ′, ρ) as well.
First assume that ρ is empty, so that α is Alice’s announcement of f : Ω→
F
d+1
q . Then, F
d+1
q \ f [HA] = F
d+1
q \ f [H
′
A], so that V = F
d+1
q \ f [H
′
A] is a
transversal hyperplane, and since f was already a bijection, f ∈ SP
(
H ′, ()
)
.
Otherwise, X = Bk for some k, and the last announcement is of the form
Xk = π
σ
V [f [HBk ]]. Let V
′ = Fd+1q \ f [H
′
A]. Then, V
′ is a hyperplane containing
H ′Bk = HBk . Thus, HBk ⊆ V ∩ V
′ and hence |HBk | ≤ |V ∩ V
′|. But if V 6= V ′
then |V ∩ V ′| ≤ qd−1 < |HBk |, which is impossible. We conclude that V = V
′
and thus Xk = π
σ
V ′ [f [H
′
Bk
]]. It follows that Xk ∈ SP
(
H ′, ρ).
It remains to check that the protocol is equitative in the sense of Definition
4.2, that is, that |SP(H, ρ)| depends on ρ and not on H . This is not hard to
see: when ρ = (), the number of bijections f : Ω → Fd+1q such that f [HA] is
the complement of a hyperplane clearly does not depend on H , since different
deals are obtained merely by permuting the cards. If on the other hand ρ =
f,X1, . . . , Xk−1, then the value of Xk is uniquely determined by the expression
Xk = π
σ
V [f [HBk ]]; hence |SP(H, ρ)| = 1 for any deal H . We conclude that the
shifted projection protocol is an equitative protocol, as claimed.
Now that we know we have a protocol, let us check that it is indeed infor-
mative and perfectly safe. We will proceed by breaking the proof into several
steps. First, let us check that the protocol is informative.
Lemma 6.2. The shifted projection protocol is informative for any choice of
suitable parameters.
Proof. Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable parameters. Let (H, ρ) be a terminal execution
of the protocol, and let X 6= Y be agents. We must check that, if (H ′, ρ) is
another terminal execution of the protocol with H ′X = HX , then also H
′
Y = HY .
First assume that Y = A, so that X = Bj for some j. In this case, V =
F
d+1
q \ f [HA] is the unique hyperplane such that f [HBj ] ⊂ V , and similarly
V ′ = Fd+1q \ f [H
′
A] is the unique hyperplane such that f [HBj ] = f [H
′
Bj
] ⊂ V ′.
It follows that V = V ′ as well and thus HA = H
′
A.
Now assume that Y = Bk 6= A. Note that by the previous case, HA = H
′
A
and thus if we set V = Fd+1q \ f [HA], then we also have V = F
d+1
q \ f [H
′
A].
It follows by the definition of the protocol that Bk has made an announcement
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of the form Xk = π
σ
V [f [HBk ]], so that by Lemma 5.4, ι
σ
V [Xk] = f [HBk ]. Simi-
larly, since (H ′, ρ) is also an execution of our protocol, ισV [Xk] = f [H
′
Bk
]. Thus
f [HBk ] = f [HBk ]; since f is a bijection, HBk = H
′
Bk
, as claimed.
It remains to check that the shifted projection protocol is perfectly safe.
This will require a bit more work.
7 Perfect safety of the shifted projection proto-
col
To prove that the shifted projection protocol is perfectly safe, we will construct
new deals that the eavesdropper may consider possible after its execution. The
following definition shows how we will do this.
Definition 7.1. Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable parameters. Suppose that
ρ = f,X1, . . . , Xm
is such that f : Ω→ Fd+1q and each Xi ⊂ F
d
q , and let V ∈ TH
d+1
q .
For each agent X define a hand H
(V,ρ)
X by
• H
(V,ρ)
A = f
−1[Fd+1q \ V ]
• for k ∈ [1,m], H
(V,ρ)
Bk
= f−1[ισV [Xk]].
Lemma 7.1. Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable parameters. If
ρ = f,X1, . . . , Xm
is such that f : Ω → Fd+1q is a bijection, X1, . . . , Xm form a partition of F
d
q
and |Xj | = τj for all j, then for any transversal hyperplane V , H
(V,ρ) is a deal
of distribution type τ and (H(V,ρ), ρ) is an execution of the shifted projection
protocol.
Proof. First let us check that H(V,ρ) is a deal of distribution type τ . For it to be
a deal merely means that it is a partition of Ω. Since |τ | = qd+1 = |Ω|, this boils
down to checking that all hands are disjoint and that each agent X holds τX
cards. So suppose X 6= Y are two agents. If one of them (say, X ) is Alice and
Y = Bk, then we observe that Alice holds the complement of f
−1[V ] whereas
ισV [Xk] ⊂ V , so that H
(V,ρ)
Bk
= f−1[ισV [Xk]] ⊂ f
−1[V ] and hence the two agents’
hands are disjoint. If on the other hand X = Bj and Y = Bk, then since f
−1
and ισV are injective and Xj and Xk are disjoint, then H
(V,ρ)
Bj
= f−1[ισV [Xj ]] is
disjoint from H
(V,ρ)
Bk
= f−1[ισV [Xk]]. We conclude that all hands of H
(V,ρ) are
disjoint.
The injectivity of f−1 and ισV also gives us∣∣∣H(V,ρ)A ∣∣∣ = |Fd+1q \ V | = qd+1 − qd = τA,
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as well as ∣∣∣H(V,ρ)Bk
∣∣∣ = ∣∣f−1[ισV [Xk]]∣∣ = |Xk| = τBk
for all k ∈ [1,m], so indeed H(V,ρ) is a deal of distribution type τ .
Finally, let us check that (H(V,ρ), ρ) is an execution of the shifted projection
protocol. We have assumed that f is bijective and that f [H
(V,ρ)
A ] = F
d+1
q \ V is
obvious by the definition of H
(V,ρ)
A . Meanwhile, using Lemma 5.4, we have for
each agent Bk that
πσV ◦ f [H
(V,ρ)
Bk
] = πσV ◦ f [f
−1 ◦ ισV [Xk]] = π
σ
V ◦ ι
σ
V [Xk] = Xk,
so that indeed (H(V,ρ), ρ) is an execution of our protocol.
Moreover, H(V,ρ) is unique, in the following sense.
Lemma 7.2. Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable parameters. If H is a deal, ρ =
f,X1, . . . , Xm is a run such that (H, ρ) is an execution of the shifted projec-
tion protocol and V = Fd+1q \ f [HA], then H = H
(V,ρ).
Proof. Once we have fixed V , then for any agent Bk we must have HBk =
ιV [Xk] = H
(V,ρ)
Bk
, and since Alice also holds the same hand in H and H(V,ρ), the
two deals must be equal.
The deals H(V,ρ) will be essential in showing that the protocol is perfectly
safe. In fact, we will show that given any agent X and any run of the protocol ρ,
the set of possible deals where X holds c is precisely τX , as was the case in the
example on Section 2. Below we use the notation
(
Ω
τ : C1 . . . , Cn
)
, introduced
in Definition 4.1.
Lemma 7.3. Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable parameters, ρ be a run of the shifted
projection protocol and X be any agent. Then,∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
X
)∣∣ = τX .
Proof. Suppose that ρ = f,X1, . . . , Xm and let c ∈ Ω be any card. We will
consider the cases where X = A and where X = Bk separately.
Counting deals where Alice holds c Let c be any card; we wish to count
the number of deals H such that (H, ρ) is an execution of the shifted projection
protocol and c ∈ HA. Now, the complement of f [HA] is a transversal hyperplane
V , which should not contain f(c). By Lemma 5.1, there are qd+1 transversal
hyperplanes and qd touching f(c), which leaves qd+1 − qd avoiding f(c). By
Lemma 7.1, for each such V , H(V,ρ) is a deal such that (H(V,ρ), ρ) is an execution
of the shifted projection protocol, and where Alice holds c. Moreover, by Lemma
7.2, this is the unique deal with such properties. It follows that the possible
deals where Alice holds s are in bijection with the set of transversal hyperplanes
avoiding f(c), and thus ∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
A
)∣∣ = qd+1 − qd = τA.
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Counting deals where another agent holds c Now consider the case where
X = Bk for some k. In this case, we claim that the possible deals where Bk
holds c are in bijection with Xk. For this, we will define a function
h : Xk →
(
Ω
τ : ρ, c
Bk
)
and show that it is bijective.
Fix v ∈ Xk. Let w = π(f(c)), and pick the unique U ∈ TH
d+1
q [f(c)] such
that σ(U) = v − w (which exists by Lemma 5.2). Denote this U by Uv.
Now, let h(v) = H(U
v ,ρ). We claim that h gives the desired bijection. First
let us check that h(v) ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ, c
Bk
)
whenever v ∈ Xk. By Lemma 7.1, h(v) =
H(U
v ,ρ) is a new deal and (h(v), ρ) is an execution of the shifted projection
protocol, so h(v) ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ
)
. Moreover, note that
ισUv (v) = ιUv (v − σ(U
v)) = ιUv (w) = f(c).
But v ∈ Xk so f(c) ∈ ι
σ
Uv [Xk], that is,
c ∈ f−1[ισW [Xk]] = H
(Uv ,ρ)
Bk
= h(v)Bk .
In other words, Bk holds c in the deal h(v); by definition, this means that
h(v) ∈
(
Ω
τ : c
Bk
)
. We conclude that h(v) ∈
(
Ω
τ : ρ, c
Bk
)
, as claimed.
Next let us check that h is injective. If v 6= v′ ∈ Xi then v − w 6= v
′ − w, so
that Uv 6= Uv
′
and thus h(v) 6= h(v′), since Alice would hold a different hand
in each deal. Since v, v′ were arbitrary, we conclude that h is indeed injective.
Finally, let us see that h is onto. LetH be any deal where Bk holds c and such
that (H, ρ) is an execution of SP. Let V be the complement of f [HA]. Then,
Xk = π
σ
V [f [HBk ]], so that π(f(c)) + σ(V ) ∈ Xk. As before, let w = π(f(c)) and
v = w + σ(V ). Then, v ∈ Xk and v − w = σ(V ). But since V touches f(c)
and σ is a bijection when restricted to THd+1q [f(c)] (once again by Lemma 5.2),
it follows that V = Uv and, by Lemma 7.2, H = H(V,ρ) = h(v). Since H was
arbitrary, we conclude that h is onto.
Therefore h is a bijection and∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
Bk
)∣∣ = |Xk| = τBk ,
as desired.
Since we have now considered all possible cases for X ∈ I, the lemma follows.
We now have all the ingredients we need to prove our main theorem.
Lemma 7.4. The shifted projection protocol is perfectly safe for any choice of
suitable parameters.
Proof. Let (m, q, d, τ) be suitable parameters, c a card and X an agent. By
Lemma 7.3,
∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
X
)∣∣ = τX . Moreover, | (Ωτ : ρ) | is equal to the number of
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transversal hyperplanes in Fd+1q , which by Lemma 5.1 is q
d+1 = |τ |. Thus by
Proposition 4.1,
P(c ∈ HX |ρ) =
∣∣(Ω
τ : ρ, c
X
)∣∣
|(Ωτ : ρ)|
=
τX
|τ |
,
and since X was arbitrary, this means that the protocol is perfectly safe.
With this, we may prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. By Lemma 6.1, the shifted projection protocol is a pro-
tocol according to Definition 3.3; moreover, by Lemma 6.2, it is informative,
whereas by Lemma 7.4, it is perfectly safe, as needed.
8 Finding balanced distribution types
The shifted projection protocol has the disadvantage that one agent must hold
a disproportionate portion of the cards. However, this can be controlled to
a certain extent. In this section we will show how, given the number m of
agents, one may find suitable distribution types over m agents that are not too
unbalanced.
For this we will use the following lemma.
Lemma 8.1. Given a natural number m > 0 there is a prime power q such that
m < q ≤ 2m.
Proof. Just take q to be the unique power of 2 satisfying the required bounds.
There are many possible improvements to this result (for example we may
take q to be prime using Bertrand’s postulate), but this simple version will
suffice for our purposes. With this, we may prove the following.
Corollary 8.1. Given a set I = {A,B1, . . . ,Bm} of m + 1 agents, there are
infinitely many values of a such that the shifted projection protocol is informative
and perfectly safe for some distribution type τ over I such that, for each agent
X ∈ I, τX ∈ (a, 4m
2a).
Proof. Fix m and use Lemma 8.1 to find a prime power q ∈ (m, 2m]. Fix an
arbitrary d > 1 and define τ by setting τA = q
d+1 − qd and, for k ∈ [1,m− 1],
τBk = q
d−1 + 1. Finally, let τBm = q
d − (m− 1)(qd−1 + 1). Set a = qd−1.
Clearly |τ | = qd+1, while
τA = q
d+1 − qd < qd+1 ≤ 4m2qd−1 = 4m2a.
For k ∈ [1,m− 1], it is obvious that τk > q
d−1, while τm > q
d−1 because
qd − (m− 1)(qd−1 + 1) ≥ qd − (q − 2)(qd−1 + 1) = 2qd−1 − q + 2 > qd−1.
Hence τX ∈ (a, 2m
2a) for all agents X and the parameters (m, q, d, τ) are suit-
able, so that by Theorem 6.1, the shifted projection protocol is informative and
perfectly safe for these parameters.
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τ m q d
(18, 4, 5) 2 3 2
(54, 13, 14) 2 3 4
(162, 40, 41) 2 3 5
(486, 121, 122) 2 3 6
τ m q d
(48, 5, 5, 6) 3 4 2
(192, 21, 21, 22) 3 4 3
(100, 6, 6, 6, 7) 4 5 2
(500, 31, 31, 31, 32) 4 5 3
Figure 3: Some choices of suitable parameters. Note that the number of agents
is m+ 1 as Alice is counted separately.
As an application, let us return to the example of Section 2. There were
three agents, so we chose q = 4 and d = 1. The disadvantage was that the
distribution type was noticeably unbalanced, since Alice held the vast majority
of the cards. However, as the construction in the proof of Corollary 8.1 shows,
we can actually take q = 3 provided d > 1. For d = 2 and q = 3, we obtain the
distribution type (18, 4, 5). Observe that Alice holds about four times as many
cards as any other agent. In Figure 3, we see how this is also true for larger
values of d. We also see how Alice must hold an increasingly larger portion of
the cards as the number of agents rises, but for a fixed m, the number of cards
she holds grows linearly with respect to the others’.
9 Concluding remarks
We have presented a protocol whereby a number of agents holding information
that has been privately dealt to them may share it securely even if their com-
munications are intercepted. For convenience of exposition this information is
modelled as a deck of cards, but the ‘cards’ may represent any type of sensitive
information, such as characters in a password. Our protocol may be used for
secret-sharing or other applications that require unconditionally secure aggrega-
tion of information, and provides a higher level of security than that in previous
work [6].
For future work it may be of interest to consider possible variations or gen-
eralizations, for example based on a wider class of combinatorial designs. There
are several advantages that such variations might have. First of all, our protocol
requires for one agent to hold a large portion of the deck, so it would be conve-
nient to find solutions that work for a larger class of distribution types. Second,
we may be interested in obtaining an even higher level of security; [13] consid-
ered the notion of k-perfect security, where the probability that a given agent
holds a set of at most k cards does not change after the agents’ announcements.
In the two-agent case this is stronger than perfect safety (i.e., 1-perfect security)
when k > 1, and a multi-agent generalization might also be fruitful. Finally,
we mention that solutions which allow Eve to hold cards would be of interest,
as finding protocols for such a setting could be useful for applications where
portions of the private information has been compromised by the eavedsropper.
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